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CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-TIME, INC. v. HILL. In
February 1955, Life magazine published an article which stated that the
Broadway play "The Desperate Hours," based on a novel by Joseph
Hayes, was a re-enactment of an actual experience of the James Hill
family.' James Hill brought an action in the New York courts against
author Hayes and Time, Inc. publishers of Life. Hill sought damages
under New York's "right of privacy" law,2 contending that the article
and its accompanying photographs falsely depicted his family's exper-
ience.3 He obtained a judgment for $30,000, which was affirmed by the
New York Court of Appeals.4 Time, Inc. appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, claiming that the New York court's applica-
tion of the statute had denied Time, Inc. the rights of free speech and
press guaranteed by the First Amendment.5
The Supreme Court, reversing the New York Court of Appeals, held
that constitutional protections for speech and press preclude recovery
under the right of privacy statute for "false reports of matters of public
interest," in the absence of proof that the report was published "with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth." "
This decision, in resolving the constitutional conflict, has focused
new attention on the amorphous "right of privacy." Although the right
has been recognized for some time, it is not specifically guaranteed by
the Constitution.7 It was formally stated for the first time in a famous
subjective impossibility. It is only where, by supervening event, the performance can-
not be rendered by anyone that the duty is discharged." sIMPSON, CONTh ars, Section
175 (2d ed. 1965).
1. During September 1952, the Hills were held hostage for 19 hours in their White-
marsh, Pennsylvania home by three escaped convicts. The incident received consider-
able publicity, but Hill resisted efforts by the news media to keep his family in the
limelight.
2. New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51. Although this statute specifically prohibits
only the use of the name or picture of the plaintiff in "trade" or "advertising," the New
York courts have construed these terms very broadly.
3. The article included photographs posed by actors in the house where the Hills
were imprisoned. These photographs portrayed scenes of violence presented in the
play. In reality, the Hills were treated with courtesy and released unharmed.
4. Hill v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965) (memorandum
decision).
5. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press...." u.s. co sT. amend. I. It has been repeatedly held that this amendment was
made applicable to the several states by u.s. coNsr. amend. XIV. See e.g., Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
6. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 87 S.Ct. 534 (1967).
7. The right of privacy is, however, sometimes referred to as a "penumbral" right
implied by the Bill of Rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Harvard Law Review article co-authored by Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis in 1890.8 Nevertheless, invasion of privacy is now
actionable as a common law tort in thirty states, and four states have
right of privacy statutes.
Despite this general acknowledgment of the right of privacy, how-
ever, the criteria for recovery under the New York law have never
been clearly defined by the courts of that state. Liability has been deter-
mined by judicial application of various (and sometimes conflicting)
tests. In an early case brought in Federal court under the New York
law, it was held that publication of information about a public figure
was not actionable, even though the person had attained notoriety in-
voluntarily and the news was "stale." 10 Both this decision and at least
one subsequent New York case1 appeared to stand for the proposition
that, in the case of a public figure, no action would lie even though the
information published was private and intimate, at least where the in-
formation was true.
The corollary to this principle was set forth in a 1947 New York
decision which announced that the test of liability was "fictionalization"
of the information published. The "fictionalization," to be actionable,
had to be "substantial" and "offensive," with the emphasis apparently on
"offensiveness." 12
When the New York courts considered the Hill case, the test of
fictionalization was applied in allowing recovery, but dicta in the con-
curring opinion of the Appellate Division stated that truth would not
be a defense if the item were not "newsworthy," or if the information
8. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
9. New York, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia. The Virginia statute is set forth at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-650 (1950).
10. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940), in which a former child prodigy brought suit under the New York law
for publication of a biographical article and cartoon in the New Yorker magazine.
11. Goelet v. Confidential, Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 226, 171 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1st Dep't
1958), which held that a complaint alleging that defendant magazine presented a sordid
article using plaintiff's name and photograph without his consent was insufficient to
state a cause of action under the New York Civil Rights Law.
12. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne, & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779
(Sup. Cr.), aff'd per curiam, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dep't 1947), in
which an eminent conductor was denied an injunction against publication of an un-
authorized biography. See also Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 41
Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 19 App. Div. 2d 865, 244




was presented solely for the purpose of increasing circulation.' 3 The
Court of Appeals affirmed this decision "on the majority and concurring
opinions" of the Appellate Division.14
The most recent New York case, Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.,"3
also relied upon the fictionalization test in imposing liability. However,
while the trial court found the fictionalization "offensive," 16 the Ap-
pellate Division thought it laudatory (although embarrassing)." By
affirring recovery, the Appellate Division apparently disregarded the
earlier criterion of "offensiveness." The Court of Appeals, affirming,
rested its decision on the fictionalization test, but (as in the Hill case)
implied that only "newsworthy" material was protected.'
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court decision in Hill, recovery under
New York's right of privacy law was predicated upon the test of "fic-
tionalization," but, per assorted inferences and dicta, true statements
might also be actionable if they were made solely for the purpose of in-
creasing circulation (Hill) or if they are found not to be "newsworthy"
(Hill and Spahn).
In none of these New York decisions was the constitutional issue
squarely faced.19 Consequently, the constitutionality of the New York
courts' interpretation of the right of privacy statute was before the
Supreme Court for the first time. However, several analogous decisions
involving freedom of speech and press had previously been rendered
13. Hill v. Hayes, 18 App. Div. 2d 485, 491, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286, 293 (lst Dep't
1963).
14. Hill v. Hayes, supra, note 4.
15. 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1964), afi'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 216, 260
N.Y.S.2d 451 (1st Dep't 1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E. 2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877
(1966), awarding damages and injunctive relief to a baseball player for inaccurate
statements in an unauthorized biography.
16. Id., 43 Misc. 2d at 232, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 542-43. This opinion indicated that an
action might lie for the publication of factually correct information also, if the in-
formation were sufficiendy "private." 43 Misc. 2d at 232, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
17. Id, 23 App. Div. 2d at 221, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
18. Supra, note 15.
19. The Court of Appeals had taken pains to construe and apply the statute in
a manner which would avoid constitutional conflicts. In other states, possible conflicts
between the right of privacy and the First Amendment had been avoided by findings
that the items in question were "trade" or "commerce," rather than "speech," and were
thus excluded from the protection of the amendment. In Utah, communications media
are excluded from the action of the right of privacy statute, and recovery is con-
fined to cases of advertising or other clearly commercial material. See Donahue v.
Warner Brothers Pictures Distrib. Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954). The New
York decisions, as previously noted, have construed "trade" and "commerce" much
more liberally.
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by the Court in libel actions. In Winters v. New York 20 the Court ex-
tended the protection of the First Amendment to materials published
solely for their commercial entertainment value.21 Then, in the leading
case of New York Times v. Sullivan,- the Court held that no state libel
law could permit suit by a public official for criticism of his conduct in
office, absent actual "malice" on the part of the publisher. 2 In a subse-
quent decision, the Court made it clear that it was prepared to extend
the principle of New York Times v. Sullivan in cases where "interests
in public discussion are particularly strong." 24 These decisions on free-
dom of speech and press, although ostensibly confined to the field of
libel, had plainly demonstrated that the provisions of the First Amend-
ment were considered paramount to individual rights, in the absence of
deliberate falsehood or wanton disregard of the truth.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,'5 the Supreme Court was faced with a direct
and unprecedented conflict between freedom of speech and press and
the developing right of privacy. Although the opinion in the Hill case
denies "blind application" of the principle of New York Times v. Sulli-
van, the decision in Hill is basically an extension of the constitutional
reasoning of the Times case to the area of right of privacy, and a re-
jection of the less stringent "fictionalization" criterion of the New
York courts.26 The Court states that ". . . sanctions against either inno-
cent or negligent misstatement would present a grave hazard of dis-
couraging the press from exercising the constitutional guarantees," 27 but
"sanctions against calculated falsehood will not impair the function of
these constitutional provisions.2 s The Court then announces that "...
the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection." 2
20. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
21. "We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional protection for
a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line between the informing
and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right." Id. at 510.
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. Followed in a subsequent libel action, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
24. Rosenblatt v. Bauer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), at 86. See also Pauling v. News Syndi-
cate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 968 (1965).
25. Supra, note 6.
26. Note, however, that the Court did not declare the New York right of privacy
statute unconstitutional. The reversal was based solely upon the failure of the trial
judge to give an instruction on the requirement of a finding of knowing or reckless
publication of false material.
27. Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, note 6, at 543.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., quoting from Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, note 23 at 75. It should be noted
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Thus the Supreme Court in its opinion makes it evident that the
primary consideration is the encouragement of a free press as guaranteed
by the First Amendment, and that the right of privacy, although recog-
nized,30 is subordinate to the rights of freedom of press and speech.
Charles E. Friend
Constitutional Law-CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION. During a pre-tri-al
hearing for a writ of habeas corpus, counsel for Donald Chambers,
charged with first degree murder, noticed the presence of William
Prime. Prime was employed as a reporter for the petitioner, Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc. Fearing prejudicial pre-trial publicity, Chamber's
counsel requested the court to enjoin all persons from disclosing what
had transpired at the hearing. Although the court so ordered, the peti-
tioner published an account of these proceedings, and the court ordered
the petitioner to appear and show cause why it should not be held for
contempt.
Phoenix Newspapers initiated an action in the Supreme Court of
Arizona1 to prohibit the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona,
from proceeding with the contempt hearing. In granting the prohibition
the court based its decision upon the guarantees of a free press and
public trial contained in Article 2 of the constitution of Arizona.2 It
ruled that a court cannot directly limit a newspaper's right to inform
the public of what had transpired in open court.3
Where the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press4 come
into conflict with the right of an accused to a fair and speedy trial
by an impartial jury,8 there arises a problem of interpreting the courts'
that the narrow holding of Time, Inc. v. Hill limits the effect of the decision to "re-
ports of matters of public interest," a theme which appears repeatedly in the libel
cases cited above. The term "public interest" is construed very broadly by the Court,
however, and is not limited to comment upon public affairs or the expression of
political ideas, nor is "timeliness and importance" necessary to the enjoyment of the
constitutional protection. Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, note 6, at 542.
30. A recent decision has restricted the power of government to interfere with the
individual's right of privacy. See Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, note 7.
1. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594 (Ariz. 1966).
2. ARiz. CoNsT. art. 2 § 6, which provides that "Every person may freely speak,
write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." It is
further provided in § 11 that "Justice in all cases shall be determined openly, and
without unnecessary delay."
3. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra note 1.
4. U.S. Co,-;sT. amend. I.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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